Order Effects in Individual and Group Policy Allocations

Abstract:     
Although citizen panels have become quite popular for policy making, there is very little research on how the procedures these groups employ to manage consensus affect their decision making. We measured the effect of a simple procedural mechanism, agenda order, on individual and group allocations for an HIV policy. Allocations made in a large-small (state-region-city) order were substantially smaller, overall, than were allocations made in small-large (city-region-state) order, and group allocations were smaller, overall, than were individual judgments. The Social Judgment Scheme model (Davis, 1996) provided a good fit of the group allocation, and suggested a mechanism for this overall downward shift in judgment. Normative (i.e. calibration) analyses, as well as subjective impressions (e.g. confidence, repeat judgments) favored relatively smaller allocations so that judgments made in large-small order, and judgments made in groups were arguably more defensible than were individual or small-large judgments. We discuss these strong agenda influences and their implications both for citizen panels and for theoretical research on group consensus.

Keywords: group decision making, behavioral economics, consensus, AIDS, social judgment, agendas

JEL Classification: C91, D12

Accepted Paper Series