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Payoff Dominance vs. Cognitive Transparency in Decision Making


Julie R. Irwin


University of Texas - Mccombs School of Business

Gary McClelland


University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Psychology

Michael McKee


Appalachian State University - Department of Economics

William D. Schulze


Cornell University - Department of Economics

February 10, 1998

Economic Inquiry, Vol. 36, pp. 272-285, 1998

Abstract:     
This paper reports on three laboratory experiments designed to investigate the roles of decision costs and rewards on the accuracy of economic decisions. The experimental vehicle is a purchase decision employing the Becker-DeGroot-Marshak (BDM) mechanism. The first experiment verifies the incentive-compatibility of the BDM in a pure induced-value setting; the second tests its performance under different information regimes and payoff schedules; the third addresses the role of feedback information. Steep payoff schedules are found to be necessary to optimizing behavior only in cases where subjects must search out an optimal strategy rather than being able to deduce it from information provided.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 14

Keywords: behavioral economics, experimental economics, becker-degroot-marshak, auctions, incentive compatibility

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Date posted: February 11, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Irwin, Julie R., McClelland, Gary, McKee, Michael and Schulze, William D., Payoff Dominance vs. Cognitive Transparency in Decision Making (February 10, 1998). Economic Inquiry, Vol. 36, pp. 272-285, 1998. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1340665

Contact Information

Julie R. Irwin (Contact Author)
University of Texas - Mccombs School of Business ( email )
1 University Station B6700
Austin, TX 78712
United States
Gary McClelland
University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Psychology ( email )
Boulder, 80309
United States
Michael McKee
Appalachian State University - Department of Economics ( email )
Boone, NC 28608
United States
William D. Schulze
Cornell University - Department of Economics ( email )
414 Uris Hall
Ithaca, NY 14853-7601
United States
607-255-9611 (Phone)
607-255-9984 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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