Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1341006
 
 

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How Much of the Diversification Discount Can be Explained by Poor Corporate Governance?


Daniel Hoechle


University of Basel - Department of Finance

Markus M. Schmid


University of St. Gallen - Swiss Institute of Banking and Finance; University of St. Gallen - SoF: School of Finance

Ingo Walter


New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business; New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance

David Yermack


New York University (NYU) - Stern School of Business

July 15, 2011


Abstract:     
We investigate whether the diversification discount occurs partly as an artifact of poor corporate governance. In panel data models, we find that the discount narrows by 16% to 21% when we add governance variables as regression controls. We also estimate Heckman selection models that account for the endogeneity of diversification and dynamic panel generalized method of moments models that account for the endogeneity of both diversification and governance. We find that the diversification discount persists even with these controls for endogeneity. However, in selection models the discount disappears entirely when we introduce governance variables in the second stage, and in dynamic panel GMM models the discount narrows by 37% when we include governance variables.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 52

Keywords: Organizational structure, Diversification, Firm valuation, Corporate governance

JEL Classification: G32, G34

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Date posted: February 11, 2009 ; Last revised: June 15, 2013

Suggested Citation

Hoechle, Daniel and Schmid, Markus M. and Walter, Ingo and Yermack, David, How Much of the Diversification Discount Can be Explained by Poor Corporate Governance? (July 15, 2011). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1341006 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1341006

Contact Information

Daniel Hoechle
University of Basel - Department of Finance ( email )
Holbeinstrasse 12
Basel, CH-4051
Switzerland
+41 61 267 32 43 (Phone)
Markus M. Schmid (Contact Author)
University of Saint Gallen - Swiss Institute of Banking and Finance ( email )
Rosenbergstrasse 52
St. Gallen, 9000
Switzerland
University of Saint Gallen - SoF: School of Finance ( email )
Rosenbergstrasse 52
St.Gallen, CH-9000
Switzerland

Ingo Walter
New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )
44 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012
United States
212-998-0707 (Phone)
212-995-4220 (Fax)
New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance
Stern School of Business
44 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012-1126
United States
David Yermack
New York University (NYU) - Stern School of Business ( email )
44 West 4th Street
Suite 9-160
New York, NY 10012-1126
United States
212-998-0357 (Phone)
212-995-4220 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~dyermack
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