Moving Past Collusion in Major League Baseball: Healing Old Wounds, and Preventing New Ones

39 Pages Posted: 12 Feb 2009

See all articles by Marc Edelman

Marc Edelman

City University of New York - Baruch College, Zicklin School of Business; Fordham University School of Law

Date Written: Fall 2008

Abstract

This article presents a plan for Major League Baseball to move past its history of collusion, and into a new era marked by more collegial labor-management relations. Part I of this Article provides an historical analysis of Baseball's reserve system, free agency system, and anti-collusion requirements. Part II discusses the three 1980s arbitration decisions that each found Major League Baseball club owners to have illegally colluded in violation of the Major League Basic Agreement ("Collective Bargaining Agreement" or "CBA"). Part III discusses more recent allegations of collusion pertaining to the 2002 and 2007 Baseball off-seasons. Part IV explains how Baseball's history of collusion continues haunt the game's integrity in terms of both its labor-management relationship and its relationship with fans. Part V suggests a series of best practices that Major League Baseball should adopt to move past its dark history of collusion and toward a new period of labor-management cooperation.

Keywords: sports, sports law, sports economics, collusion, baseball, baseball collusion, Bud Selig, steroids, Barry Bonds, Alex Rodriguez, Andre Dawson, antitrust, colelctive bargaining, labor relations

Suggested Citation

Edelman, Marc, Moving Past Collusion in Major League Baseball: Healing Old Wounds, and Preventing New Ones (Fall 2008). Wayne Law Review, Vol. 54, No. 3, 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1341333

Marc Edelman (Contact Author)

City University of New York - Baruch College, Zicklin School of Business ( email )

One Bernard Baruch Way
Box B9-220
New York, NY 10010
United States

Fordham University School of Law ( email )

140 West 62nd Street
New York, NY 10023
United States

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