Abstract

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Moving Past Collusion in Major League Baseball: Healing Old Wounds, and Preventing New Ones


Marc Edelman


Zicklin School of Business, Baruch College, City University of New York; Fordham University School of Law

Fall 2008

Wayne Law Review, Vol. 54, No. 3, 2008

Abstract:     
This article presents a plan for Major League Baseball to move past its history of collusion, and into a new era marked by more collegial labor-management relations. Part I of this Article provides an historical analysis of Baseball's reserve system, free agency system, and anti-collusion requirements. Part II discusses the three 1980s arbitration decisions that each found Major League Baseball club owners to have illegally colluded in violation of the Major League Basic Agreement ("Collective Bargaining Agreement" or "CBA"). Part III discusses more recent allegations of collusion pertaining to the 2002 and 2007 Baseball off-seasons. Part IV explains how Baseball's history of collusion continues haunt the game's integrity in terms of both its labor-management relationship and its relationship with fans. Part V suggests a series of best practices that Major League Baseball should adopt to move past its dark history of collusion and toward a new period of labor-management cooperation.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 39

Keywords: sports, sports law, sports economics, collusion, baseball, baseball collusion, Bud Selig, steroids, Barry Bonds, Alex Rodriguez, Andre Dawson, antitrust, colelctive bargaining, labor relations

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Date posted: February 12, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Edelman, Marc, Moving Past Collusion in Major League Baseball: Healing Old Wounds, and Preventing New Ones (Fall 2008). Wayne Law Review, Vol. 54, No. 3, 2008. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1341333

Contact Information

Marc Edelman (Contact Author)
Zicklin School of Business, Baruch College, City University of New York ( email )
One Bernard Baruch Way
Box B9-220
New York, NY 10010
United States
Fordham University School of Law ( email )
140 West 62nd Street
New York, NY 10023
United States
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