Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1341639
 
 

References (42)



 
 

Citations (11)



 


 



Are US CEOs Paid More? New International Evidence


Nuno Fernandes


IMD International

Miguel A. Ferreira


Nova School of Business and Economics; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Pedro P. Matos


University of Virginia - Darden School of Business; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Kevin J. Murphy


University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business; University of Southern California - Department of Economics; USC Gould School of Law

May 22, 2012

EFA 2009 Bergen Meetings Paper
AFA 2011 Denver Meetings Paper
ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 255/2009

Abstract:     
This paper challenges the widely accepted stylized fact that CEOs in the United States are paid significantly more than their foreign counterparts. Using CEO pay data across 14 countries with mandated pay disclosures, we show that the US pay premium is economically modest and primarily reflects the performance-based pay demanded by institutional shareholders and independent boards. Indeed, we find no significant difference in either level of CEO pay or the use of equity-based pay between US and non-US firms exposed to international and US capital, product, and labor markets. We also show that US and non-US CEO pay has largely converged in the 2000s. The findings are robust to alternative methods for adjusting the risk of equity-based pay.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 50

Keywords: Executive compensation, CEO pay, International pay differences, Stock options, Corporate governance

JEL Classification: G32, G34, G38

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: February 12, 2009 ; Last revised: June 19, 2012

Suggested Citation

Fernandes, Nuno and Ferreira, Miguel A. and Matos, Pedro P. and Murphy, Kevin J., Are US CEOs Paid More? New International Evidence (May 22, 2012). EFA 2009 Bergen Meetings Paper; AFA 2011 Denver Meetings Paper; ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 255/2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1341639 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1341639

Contact Information

Nuno Fernandes (Contact Author)
IMD International ( email )
Ch. de Bellerive 23
P.O. Box 915
CH-1001 Lausanne
Switzerland
Miguel Almeida Ferreira
Nova School of Business and Economics ( email )
Campus de Campolide
Lisbon, 1099-032
Portugal
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
Pedro P. Matos
University of Virginia - Darden School of Business ( email )
University of Virginia
P.O. Box 6550
Charlottesville, VA 22906-6550
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
Kevin J. Murphy
University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business ( email )
BRI 308, MC 0804
Los Angeles, CA 90089-0804
United States
213-740-6553 (Phone)
213-740-6650 (Fax)

University of Southern California - Department of Economics
3620 South Vermont Ave. Kaprielian (KAP) Hall, 300
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
USC Gould School of Law
699 Exposition Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 7,472
Downloads: 1,613
Download Rank: 4,999
References:  42
Citations:  11

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.453 seconds