The Mark-to-Market Valuation and Executive Pay Package Regulations within the 2009 US (Bailout) Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
Jamal Ibrahim Haidar
March 30, 2009
Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 189-199, September 2009
The paper shows that the effect of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) is ambiguous. It discusses the benefits and costs of mark-to-market valuation and design of executive pay package policies within the US 2009 EESA. It highlights how mark-to-market valuation standard influenced financial institutions, explains why mark-to-market policy suspension proponents can support EESA, and realizes how FASB and SEC can count on EESA while assessing the need and cost of mark-to-market policy. Also, the paper discusses the promise of executive wage caps within EESA. Moreover, it differentiates between executive pay packages pre and post EESA policies.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 13
Keywords: Corporate governance, financial crisis, bailout, EESA, mark-to-market valuation, and executive pay package caps
JEL Classification: G12, G23, J33, K23, M52
Date posted: February 13, 2009 ; Last revised: December 2, 2009
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