The Mark-to-Market Valuation and Executive Pay Package Regulations within the 2009 US (Bailout) Emergency Economic Stabilization Act

Haidar, Jamal

Abstract

Download This Paper | Share | Email |Add to Briefcase

The Mark-to-Market Valuation and Executive Pay Package Regulations within the 2009 US (Bailout) Emergency Economic Stabilization Act

Jamal Ibrahim Haidar

World Bank

March 30, 2009

Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 189-199, September 2009

Abstract:
The paper shows that the effect of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) is ambiguous. It discusses the benefits and costs of mark-to-market valuation and design of executive pay package policies within the US 2009 EESA. It highlights how mark-to-market valuation standard influenced financial institutions, explains why mark-to-market policy suspension proponents can support EESA, and realizes how FASB and SEC can count on EESA while assessing the need and cost of mark-to-market policy. Also, the paper discusses the promise of executive wage caps within EESA. Moreover, it differentiates between executive pay packages pre and post EESA policies.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 13

Keywords: Corporate governance, financial crisis, bailout, EESA, mark-to-market valuation, and executive pay package caps

JEL Classification: G12, G23, J33, K23, M52

Accepted Paper Series

Download This Paper

Date posted: February 13, 2009 ; Last revised: December 2, 2009

Suggested Citation

Haidar, Jamal Ibrahim , The Mark-to-Market Valuation and Executive Pay Package Regulations within the 2009 US (Bailout) Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (March 30, 2009). Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 189-199, September 2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1341908

Contact Information

Jamal Ibrahim Haidar (Contact Author)

World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States