Abstract

One-Click Download | Share | Email | Add to Briefcase

The Mark-to-Market Valuation and Executive Pay Package Regulations within the 2009 US (Bailout) Emergency Economic Stabilization Act

Jamal Ibrahim Haidar
University of California, Berkeley

Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 189-199, September 2009

Abstract:
The paper shows that the effect of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) is ambiguous. It discusses the benefits and costs of mark-to-market valuation and design of executive pay package policies within the US 2009 EESA. It highlights how mark-to-market valuation standard influenced financial institutions, explains why mark-to-market policy suspension proponents can support EESA, and realizes how FASB and SEC can count on EESA while assessing the need and cost of mark-to-market policy. Also, the paper discusses the promise of executive wage caps within EESA. Moreover, it differentiates between executive pay packages pre and post EESA policies.

Keywords: Corporate governance, financial crisis, bailout, EESA, mark-to-market valuation, and executive pay package caps

JEL Classifications: G12, G23, J33, K23, M52

Accepted Paper Series

Date posted: February 13, 2009 ; Last revised: December 02, 2009

Suggested Citation

Haidar, Jamal Ibrahim , The Mark-to-Market Valuation and Executive Pay Package Regulations within the 2009 US (Bailout) Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (March 30, 2009). Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 189-199, September 2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1341908

Export to: Export Citation What's this?

Contact Information

Jamal Ibrahim Haidar (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley ( email )

Berkeley, CA 94709
United States