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The Mark-to-Market Valuation and Executive Pay Package Regulations within the 2009 US (Bailout) Emergency Economic Stabilization Act

Jamal Ibrahim Haidar
University of California, Berkeley

Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Forthcoming

Abstract:
The paper shows that the effect of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) is ambiguous. It discusses the benefits and costs of mark-to-market valuation and design of executive pay package policies within the US 2009 EESA. It highlights how mark-to-market valuation standard influenced financial institutions, explains why mark-to-market policy suspension proponents can support EESA, and realizes how FASB and SEC can count on EESA while assessing the need and cost of mark-to-market policy. Also, the paper discusses the promise of executive wage caps within EESA. Moreover, it differentiates between executive pay packages pre and post EESA policies.

Keywords: Corporate governance, financial crisis, bailout, EESA, mark-to-market valuation, and executive pay package caps

JEL Classifications: G12, G23, J33, K23, M52

Accepted Paper Series

Date posted: February 13, 2009 ; Last revised: September 25, 2009

Suggested Citation

Haidar, Jamal Ibrahim , The Mark-to-Market Valuation and Executive Pay Package Regulations within the 2009 US (Bailout) Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (March 30, 2009). Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1341908

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Contact Information

Jamal Ibrahim Haidar (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley ( email )

Berkeley, CA 94709
United States