Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1342535
 
 

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What Drives the Passage of Damage Caps?


Jonathan Klick


University of Pennsylvania Law School; Erasmus School of Law; PERC - Property and Environment Research Center

Catherine M. Sharkey


New York University School of Law

February 13, 2009

EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF JUDICIAL SYSTEMS AROUND THE GLOBE, Institutum Jurisprudentiae, Academia Sinica, 2009
NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 09-08
U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 09-09

Abstract:     
A number of states have passed caps on non-economic and punitive damage awards in civil cases. The conventional wisdom is that the passage of these caps is driven by "out-of-control" jury awards that need to be reigned in. However, it could be the case that voters harboring anti-litigation, pro-tort reform sentiments are more likely to support the passage of caps even in the absence of an upsurge in awards. To examine the effect of jury awards on the passage of caps, we estimate semi-parametric hazard models of cap passage using data from the Jury Verdict Research Reporter.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 20

Keywords: punitive damages, caps, damage caps, jury awards

JEL Classification: C14, C41, K13, K41

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Date posted: February 14, 2009 ; Last revised: April 22, 2012

Suggested Citation

Klick, Jonathan and Sharkey, Catherine M., What Drives the Passage of Damage Caps? (February 13, 2009). EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF JUDICIAL SYSTEMS AROUND THE GLOBE, Institutum Jurisprudentiae, Academia Sinica, 2009; NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 09-08; U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 09-09. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1342535

Contact Information

Jonathan Klick
University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )
3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
2157463455 (Phone)
Erasmus School of Law ( email )
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands
PERC - Property and Environment Research Center
2048 Analysis Drive
Suite A
Bozeman, MT 59718
United States

Catherine M. Sharkey (Contact Author)
New York University School of Law ( email )
40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
212-998-6729 (Phone)
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