Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1342797
 
 

Citations (2)



 
 

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Why Different Jurisdictions Do Not (and Should Not) Adopt the Same Antitrust Rules


David S. Evans


University of Chicago Law School; University College London; Global Economics Group

February 16, 2009

Chicago Journal of International Law, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
This article summarizes the theory on the optimal design of antitrust rules and discusses the application of such theory in different jurisdictional settings. It establishes the proposition that divergence is the norm for antitrust rules. This paper argues that the quest for convergence is quixotic and the disdain when another jurisdiction has a different rule than one's own is uncalled for. Along the way it considers two beacons of divergence that appeared on either side of the Atlantic at the end of 2008 - the US Department of Justice's report on unilateral conduct and the European Commission's enforcement guidelines on abusive exclusionary conduct.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 23

JEL Classification: K21, L40, N40

Accepted Paper Series


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Date posted: February 13, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Evans, David S., Why Different Jurisdictions Do Not (and Should Not) Adopt the Same Antitrust Rules (February 16, 2009). Chicago Journal of International Law, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1342797

Contact Information

David S. Evans (Contact Author)
University of Chicago Law School ( email )
1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
University College London ( email )
London WC1E OEG
United Kingdom
Global Economics Group ( email )
1400 S. Dearborn, Suite 400
Chicago, IL 60603
United States
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