Why Different Jurisdictions Do Not (and Should Not) Adopt the Same Antitrust Rules
David S. Evans
University of Chicago Law School; University College London; Global Economics Group
February 16, 2009
Chicago Journal of International Law, Forthcoming
This article summarizes the theory on the optimal design of antitrust rules and discusses the application of such theory in different jurisdictional settings. It establishes the proposition that divergence is the norm for antitrust rules. This paper argues that the quest for convergence is quixotic and the disdain when another jurisdiction has a different rule than one's own is uncalled for. Along the way it considers two beacons of divergence that appeared on either side of the Atlantic at the end of 2008 - the US Department of Justice's report on unilateral conduct and the European Commission's enforcement guidelines on abusive exclusionary conduct.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 23
JEL Classification: K21, L40, N40Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: February 13, 2009
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