Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1342989
 
 

Footnotes (15)



 


 



Managerial Entrenchment and the Market for CEOs


Fabio Feriozzi


IE Business School - IE University

June 10, 2014


Abstract:     
This paper studies firms governance choices in the presence of a broadening market for managers. Board independence reduces the likelihood of managerial entrenchment but is costly, for example because of poorer decision making due to a lack of information sharing in the boardroom. Hence, firms trade off costs and benefits of independent boards. As managerial skills become less firm-specific and more portable across firms, the market for CEOs becomes wider and managerial pay increases. Moreover, a broader market for talent creates better replacement opportunities of incumbent CEOs. As a consequence, large firms, where managerial talent is more productive, choose more independent boards. Equilibrium outcomes are however inefficient if managers are subject to moral hazard and can exert effort to improve the perception of their talent. In particular, if managerial skills are general enough, boards are overly independent and managers exert inefficiently high effort in equilibrium.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 31

Keywords: Executive Compensation, Managerial Entrenchment, Career Concerns

JEL Classification: D83, D86, G34

working papers series





Download This Paper

Date posted: February 14, 2009 ; Last revised: June 11, 2014

Suggested Citation

Feriozzi, Fabio, Managerial Entrenchment and the Market for CEOs (June 10, 2014). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1342989 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1342989

Contact Information

Fabio Feriozzi (Contact Author)
IE Business School - IE University ( email )
Finance Department
Maria de Molina, 12
Madrid, 28006
Spain
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 483
Downloads: 94
Download Rank: 133,749
Footnotes:  15
Paper comments
No comments have been made on this paper

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo1 in 0.641 seconds