SSRN Home Search and Download Papers Browse Abstract and Paper Submission Subscribe to Networks View Briefcase Top Papers Top Authors Top Institutions

 

Abstract

 
 

Citations (1)

Beta

 
 

Footnotes (17)

Beta

 


 


Download | Share | Email | Add to Briefcase | Buy Hard Copy

Trust and Credit

Jefferson Duarte
Rice University

Stephan Siegel
University of Washington - Michael G. Foster School of Business

Lance A. Young
University of Washington - Department of Finance and Business Economics


February 17, 2009

AFA 2010 Atlanta Meetings Paper

Abstract:     
This study considers the impact of trustworthiness on financial markets at the individual transaction level. We employ a natural experiment using the peer-to-peer lending site, Prosper.com. We find that borrowers who are perceived as untrustworthy are economically and significantly less likely to have their loan requests filled, even controlling for physical attractiveness, detailed demographic information, credit profile, income, education, employment and loan-specific information. Indeed, in order to have the same probability of being funded as a borrower perceived as trustworthy, a borrower who is perceived as untrustworthy must pay a promised interest rate that is 182 basis points higher. These results suggest that agent's perceptions of trustworthiness are important, even in relatively information-rich environments.

Keywords: Trust, information asymmetry, consumer credit, peer-to-peer lending

JEL Classifications: D81, D83, G21

Working Paper Series

Date posted: February 16, 2009 ; Last revised: October 18, 2009

Suggested Citation

Duarte, Jefferson, Siegel, Stephan and Young, Lance A., Trust and Credit (February 17, 2009). AFA 2010 Atlanta Meetings Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1343275


Export to: Export Citation What's this?

Contact Information

Stephan Siegel (Contact Author)
University of Washington - Michael G. Foster School of Business ( email )
Box 353200
Seattle, WA 98195-3200
United States
HOME PAGE: http://faculty.washington.edu/ss1110/
Jefferson Duarte
Rice University ( email )
6100 South Main Street
P.O. Box 1892
Houston, TX 77005-1892
United States
713.3486137 (Phone)
Lance A. Young
University of Washington - Department of Finance and Business Economics ( email )
Box 353200
Seattle, WA 98195
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 4,073
Downloads: 689
Download Rank: 9,003
Citations: 1
Footnotes: 17

© 2009 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Terms of Use  Privacy Policy
This page was served by apollo4 in 0.125 seconds.