Do Financial Analysts Restrain Insiders' Informational Advantage?
Marios A. Panayides
University of Pittsburgh - Finance Group; University of Utah
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance
February 15, 2009
EFA 2009 Bergen Meetings Paper
We investigate the competitive relationship between financial analysts and firm insiders for price-sensitive information. We identify the influence of this competition on trade dynamics by empirically examining the impact of complete analysts’ coverage termination on stocks’ liquidity, price discovery and insider trading. Termination leads to a deterioration in liquidity and price efficiency, an increase in information asymmetries, and higher profitability of insider trades. Importantly, the magnitude of these effects depends on insiders’ presence. Institutional investors alleviate, but do not eliminate, the effects of coverage termination. Overall, this evidence indicates that analysts contribute to market quality through competition with insiders.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 70
Keywords: Sell-side research, Insiders, Insider Trading, Information Asymmetries, Liquidity
JEL Classification: D14, G24, D82working papers series
Date posted: February 19, 2009 ; Last revised: May 12, 2014
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