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Flaws in Banking Governance


Jean-Michel Sahut


University of Applied Sciences - Geneva School of Business Administration; University of Poitiers

Sandrine Boulerne


University Francois Rabelais-Vallorem

February 16, 2009

International Journal of Business, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2010

Abstract:     
The subprime crisis showed that governance mechanisms are still far from perfect in most organisations, and also highlighted the many flaws in bank governance systems. Indeed, the majority of organisations do not appear to consider governance as a key issue. Instead, they work from the standpoint of formal respect for the regulatory or professional provisions in place rather than one of real adherence to governance principles. In this context, our paper sets out to explore the underlying sources of their inefficiency. In particular, we identify four main areas of governance weaknesses in the banking sector: risk control, the independence and competence of board members, the compensation system for executives and traders, and the way the strategy is defined. We believe that, in addition to cultural, organisational and environmental issues, the main explanation is that executives consider governance mechanisms to be more to do with the non-destruction of value rather than with real value creation.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 20

Keywords: governance, executives, best practices, performance, value creation, bank

JEL Classification: G34, G21

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Date posted: January 7, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Sahut, Jean-Michel and Boulerne, Sandrine, Flaws in Banking Governance (February 16, 2009). International Journal of Business, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1344514

Contact Information

Jean-Michel Sahut (Contact Author)
University of Applied Sciences - Geneva School of Business Administration ( email )
CH-1227 Geneva
Switzerland
HOME PAGE: http://www.hesge.ch/heg/
University of Poitiers ( email )
POITIERS, 76130
France
HOME PAGE: http://cerege.labo.univ-poitiers.fr/
Sandrine Boulerne
University Francois Rabelais-Vallorem ( email )
50 avenue Portalis
37250
Tours FRANCE
HOME PAGE: http://droit.univ-tours.fr/
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