Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1345644
 
 

References (46)



 


 



Bonus Payments and Fund Managers' Behaviour: Trans-Atlantic Evidence


Thomas Gehrig


University of Vienna - Faculty of Business, Economics, and Statistics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Vienna Graduate School of Finance (VGSF)

Torben Lütje


University of Hannover

Lukas Menkhoff


Leibniz Universitaet Hannover - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

January 2009

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7118

Abstract:     
This questionnaire survey of fund managers in the United States, Germany and Switzerland documents a distinctly positive influence of bonus payments on investment behaviour on both sides of the Atlantic. Higher bonus payments are significantly related to higher working effort but not to risk taking. They also seem to induce fund managers to rely more on fundamental information. Findings within regions are confirmed by Trans-Atlantic evidence as US fund managers receive larger bonuses but also show the effects to a higher degree. The effects documented are stronger for relative than for absolute performance assessment.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 36

Keywords: fund managers, fundamental information, incentives

JEL Classification: G14, G23

working papers series


Date posted: February 18, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Gehrig, Thomas and Lütje, Torben and Menkhoff, Lukas, Bonus Payments and Fund Managers' Behaviour: Trans-Atlantic Evidence (January 2009). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7118. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1345644

Contact Information

Thomas Gehrig (Contact Author)
University of Vienna - Faculty of Business, Economics, and Statistics ( email )
Vienna, A-1210
Austria
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
Vienna Graduate School of Finance (VGSF) ( email )
Nordbergstraße 15
Vienna, 1090
Austria
Torben Lütje
University of Hannover ( email )
Koenigsworther Platz 1
30167 Hannover
Germany
+49 511 762 4554 (Phone)
+49 511 762 4796 (Fax)
Lukas Menkhoff
Leibniz Universitaet Hannover - Department of Economics ( email )
Koenigsworther Platz 1
30167 Hannover
Germany
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 711
Downloads: 25
References:  46

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.454 seconds