Chief Executive Pay and Remuneration Committee Independence
University of Sheffield
February 1, 2009
OXFORD BULLETIN OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS, 74, 4 (2012) 0305-9049 doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0084.2011.00660.x
This article tests the impact of remuneration committee independence on Chief Executive (CEO) pay. FTSE350 companies between 1996 and 2008 are used to assess whether remuneration committees facilitate optimal contracting or whether CEOs capture the paysetting process and inflate their own remuneration. This panel has a number of advantages over prior samples and, in particular, contains a more comprehensive assessment of nonexecutive directors’ independence. No evidence of a relationship between CEO pay and director independence is found, challenging the theory of managerial power and the received wisdom of institutional guidance.
Keywords: CEO remuneration committee independence
JEL Classification: G30, J30Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: February 19, 2009 ; Last revised: July 6, 2012
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