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Explaining the Accruals Anomaly: Evidence from Insider Trades


Julia Sawicki


Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão

Keshab Shrestha


Nanyang Technological University (NTU) - Nanyang Business School

February 19, 2009


Abstract:     
We examine competing explanations of the accruals anomaly, fixation and agency, using insider trading patterns and valuation measures. Quadratic regressions which control for confounding effects confirm an asymmetric relationship between trades and accruals concentrated on the selling side, supporting an overvalued equity agency explanation. Further evidence is provided by tests using valuation. The relationship between accruals and trading is only significant within the low book-to-market (BM) firms. There is also evidence that high BM firms manage their earnings upward compared to low BM firms. Tests using a subset of firms sorted on valuation ratios and past growth also support the agency explanation with evidence of a strong relationship between sales and accruals for the glamor firms while buying and accruals are not related for the value firms.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 35

Keywords: Accruals anomaly, Earnings management, Insider trading, Mispricing, Asymmetry, Value-Glamour, Overvalued equity

JEL Classification: G14, G30, M41, M43, D82

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Date posted: February 19, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Sawicki, Julia and Shrestha, Keshab, Explaining the Accruals Anomaly: Evidence from Insider Trades (February 19, 2009). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1346324 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1346324

Contact Information

Julia Sawicki (Contact Author)
Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão ( email )
Universidade Técnica de Lisboa
Lisbon, 1249-078
Portugal
351.309.767.142 (Phone)
Keshab Shrestha
Nanyang Technological University (NTU) - Nanyang Business School ( email )
Singapore, 639798
Singapore
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