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Commons, Anticommons, Semicommons

Lee Anne Fennell
University of Chicago Law School



RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW, Kenneth Ayotte, Henry E. Smith, eds., Edward Elgar, 2009
U of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 457
U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 261

Abstract:     
This handbook chapter offers a brief introduction to the commons, anticommons, and semicommons models and shows how the three fit together in a unified theoretical framework. I suggest that each of these templates is best understood as a lens for apprehending a single core, challenging fact about resource systems -- their need to accommodate multiple uses that are most efficiently pursued at different scales, whether simultaneously or over time.

Keywords: commons, anticommons, semicommons, prisoner's dilemma, chicken game, holdouts, scale

Accepted Paper Series

Date posted: February 25, 2009 ; Last revised: September 15, 2009

Suggested Citation

Fennell, Lee Anne, Commons, Anticommons, Semicommons (February 18, 2009). RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW, Kenneth Ayotte, Henry E. Smith, eds., Edward Elgar, 2009; U of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 457; U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 261. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1348267


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Contact Information

Lee Anne Fennell (Contact Author)
University of Chicago Law School ( email )
1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-0603 (Phone)
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