Can Appropriation Riders Speed Our Exit from Iraq?

Charles Tiefer

University of Baltimore - School of Law


Stanford Journal of International Law, Vol. 42, p. 291, 2006

To explore the implications of riders - provisions added to appropriation bills that "ride" on the underlying bill - on the United States' continued military force in Iraq, the author draws three hypotheticals, each focusing on the debate surrounding the policy and political disputes raised by the use of such riders. A "withdrawal" rider, which would authorize funding only if there exists a plan to withdraw American ground troops by a set deadline, remains the most important - and controversial - rider. Riders may also significantly affect wartime policies, like those that limit the President's use of reservists in combat so as to make them available for use in domestic affairs. Finally, Congress may attach riders to legislation that conditions military and reconstruction aid on governance concessions by the Iraqi government to the Sunni minority.

Whether enduring the difficult process of enacting riders to is worth a speedier exit from Iraq remains secondary to the important constitutional and democratic issues raised by riders attached to appropriations and legislation. Highlighting the tension between Congress and the President, the author presents the Constitutional and legal arguments presented by presidential power supporters and counter arguments proffered by Congressional supporters.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 53

Keywords: Pelosi, Rider, Bush, Iraq war, funding, withdrawal, separation of powers, foreign affairs, appropriations

JEL Classification: K39, K49, H56

Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: March 11, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Tiefer, Charles, Can Appropriation Riders Speed Our Exit from Iraq? (2006). Stanford Journal of International Law, Vol. 42, p. 291, 2006. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1349281

Contact Information

Charles Tiefer (Contact Author)
University of Baltimore - School of Law ( email )
1420 N. Charles Street
Baltimore, MD 21201
United States
Feedback to SSRN

Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 481
Downloads: 38

© 2016 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollobot1 in 0.187 seconds