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Are Judges Overpaid? A Skeptical Response to the Judicial Salary Debate


Stephen J. Choi


New York University School of Law

G. Mitu Gulati


Duke University - School of Law

Eric A. Posner


University of Chicago - Law School

January 21, 2009

The Journal of Legal Analysis, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 47-117, 2009
U of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 460

Abstract:     
The public debate over the need to raise judicial salaries has been one-sided. Sentiment appears to be that judges are underpaid. But neither theory nor evidence provides much support for this view. The primary argument being made in favor of a pay increase is that it will raise the quality of judging. Theory suggests that increasing judicial salaries will improve judicial performance only if judges can be sanctioned for performing inadequately or if the appointments process reliably screens out low-ability candidates. However, federal judges and many state judges cannot be sanctioned, and the reliability of screening processes is open to question. An empirical study of the high court judges of the fifty states provides little evidence that raising salaries would improve judicial performance.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 72

Keywords: judges, judicial salaries

JEL Classification: K10, K40

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Date posted: April 2, 2009 ; Last revised: April 15, 2009

Suggested Citation

Choi, Stephen J., Gulati, G. Mitu and Posner, Eric A., Are Judges Overpaid? A Skeptical Response to the Judicial Salary Debate (January 21, 2009). The Journal of Legal Analysis, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 47-117, 2009; U of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 460. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1349458

Contact Information

Stephen J. Choi (Contact Author)
New York University School of Law ( email )
40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
Gaurang Mitu Gulati
Duke University - School of Law ( email )
Box 90360
Duke School of Law
Durham, NC 27708
United States
Eric A. Posner
University of Chicago - Law School ( email )
1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-0425 (Phone)
773-702-0730 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/posner-e/
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