Abstract

 
 

References (82)



 
 

Citations (4)



 


 



Does Fair Value Reporting Affect Risk Management? International Survey Evidence


Karl V. Lins


University of Utah - Department of Finance

Henri Servaes


London Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Ane Tamayo


London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE)

April 27, 2010

Financial Management, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
We survey CFOs of public and private firms from 36 countries to examine whether and why firms from around the world altered their risk management policies when fair value reporting standards for derivatives were introduced, a substantial fraction of firms (42%) state that their risk management policies have been materially affected by fair value reporting. Firms are more likely to be affected by fair value reporting if they seek to use risk management to reduce the volatility of earnings relative to cash flows and if they operate in countries with low disclosure standards. Further, firms significantly reduced the use of non-linear options contracts as a result of the regulations, but did not significantly change their use of linear derivative contracts. Finally, while most firms in our sample do not use derivatives to take active positions (speculate), those who do are more likely to be affected by fair value reporting. Taken together, our evidence shows that requirements to report derivatives at fair values have had a material impact on derivative use; while speculative activities have been reduced, sound hedging strategies have been compromised as well.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 51

Keywords: risk management, speculation, derivatives, fair values, financial reporting standards

JEL Classification: G03, M41, M44, D82

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: February 27, 2009 ; Last revised: June 9, 2011

Suggested Citation

Lins, Karl V., Servaes, Henri and Tamayo, Ane Miren, Does Fair Value Reporting Affect Risk Management? International Survey Evidence (April 27, 2010). Financial Management, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1350251 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1350251

Contact Information

Karl V. Lins
University of Utah - Department of Finance ( email )
David Eccles School of Business
Salt Lake City, UT 84112
United States
801-585-3171 (Phone)
801-581-7214 (Fax)
Henri Servaes (Contact Author)
London Business School ( email )
Sussex Place
Regent's Park
London NW1 4SA
United Kingdom
+44 20 7000 8268 (Phone)
+44 20 7000 8201 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://faculty.london.edu/hservaes/
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Ane Miren Tamayo
London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) ( email )
Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
+44 (0)20 78494689 (Phone)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,777
Downloads: 534
Download Rank: 23,381
References:  82
Citations:  4

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo5 in 0.500 seconds