Between Natural Law and Legal Positivism: Dworkin and Hegel on Legal Theory
February 27, 2009
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 513-560, 2007
In this article, I argue that - despite the absence of any clear influence of one theory on the other - the legal theories of Dworkin and Hegel share several similar and, at times, unique positions that join them together within a distinctive school of legal theory, sharing a middle position between natural law and legal positivism. In addition, each theory can help the other in addressing certain internal difficulties. By recognizing both Hegel and Dworkin as proponents of a position lying in between natural law and legal positivist jurisprudence, we can gain clarity in why their general legal theories seem to fit uncomfortably, if indeed they can be said to fit at all, within so many different camps - while fitting comfortably in no particular camp - as well as highlight what has been overlooked.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 48
Keywords: Dworkin, Hegel, Brooks, legal positivism, natural law, jurisprudence, legal theory, philosophy of law, Raz, philosophy, between, natualism, positivism
JEL Classification: K0, K10, K14, K19, K30, K39, K40, K42, K49Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: February 27, 2009 ; Last revised: February 13, 2011
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