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Too Big to Fail?: Recasting the Financial Safety Net

Steven L. Schwarcz
Duke University - School of Law


March 6, 2009

Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Paper No. 235

Abstract:     
Government safety nets in the United States and abroad focus, anachronistically, on problems of banks and other financial institutions, largely ignoring financial markets which have become major credit sources for consumers and companies. Besides failing to protect these markets, this narrow focus encourages morally hazardous behavior by large institutions, like AIG and Citigroup, that are "too big to fail." This paper examines how a safety net should be recast to protect financial markets and also explains why that safety net would mitigate moral hazard and help resolve the too-big-to-fail dilemma.

Keywords: financial markets, subprime, financial crisis

Working Paper Series

Date posted: March 04, 2009 ; Last revised: March 09, 2009

Suggested Citation

Schwarcz, Steven L., Too Big to Fail?: Recasting the Financial Safety Net (March 6, 2009). Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Paper No. 235. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1352563


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Contact Information

Steven L. Schwarcz (Contact Author)
Duke University - School of Law ( email )
Box 90360
Durham, NC 27708
United States
919-613-7060 (Phone)
919-613-7231 (Fax)
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