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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1352563
 
 

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Too Big to Fail?: Recasting the Financial Safety Net


Steven L. Schwarcz


Duke University - School of Law

2010

THE PANIC OF 2008: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM, p. 94, Lawrence E. Mitchell & Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., eds., Edward Elgar, 2010

Abstract:     
Government safety nets in the United States and abroad focus, anachronistically, on problems of banks and other financial institutions, largely ignoring financial markets which have become major credit sources for consumers and companies. Besides failing to protect these markets, this narrow focus encourages morally hazardous behavior by large institutions, like AIG and Citigroup, that are "too big to fail." This paper examines how a safety net should be recast to protect financial markets and also explains why that safety net would mitigate moral hazard and help resolve the too-big-to-fail dilemma.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 24

Keywords: financial markets, subprime, financial crisis

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Date posted: March 4, 2009 ; Last revised: May 31, 2012

Suggested Citation

Schwarcz, Steven L., Too Big to Fail?: Recasting the Financial Safety Net (2010). THE PANIC OF 2008: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM, p. 94, Lawrence E. Mitchell & Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., eds., Edward Elgar, 2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1352563

Contact Information

Steven L. Schwarcz (Contact Author)
Duke University - School of Law ( email )
210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States
919-613-7060 (Phone)
919-613-7231 (Fax)
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