Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1352946
 
 

References (14)



 
 

Citations (3)



 


 



Winning Play in Spectrum Auctions


Jeremy Bulow


Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Jonathan Levin


Stanford University - Department of Economics; Stanford Graduate School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Paul R. Milgrom


Stanford Graduate School of Business

March 2009

NBER Working Paper No. w14765

Abstract:     
We describe factors that make bidding in large spectrum auctions complex -- including exposure and budget problems, the role of timing within an ascending auction, and the possibilities for price forecasting -- and how economic and game-theoretic analysis can assist bidders in overcoming these problems. We illustrate with the case of the FCC's Advanced Wireless Service auction, in which a new entrant, SpectrumCo, faced all these problems yet managed to purchase nationwide coverage at a discount of roughly a third relative to the prices paid by its incumbent competitors in the same auction, saving more than a billion dollars.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 41

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Date posted: March 5, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Bulow, Jeremy and Levin, Jonathan and Milgrom, Paul R., Winning Play in Spectrum Auctions (March 2009). NBER Working Paper No. w14765. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1352946

Contact Information

Jeremy I. Bulow (Contact Author)
Stanford University ( email )
Room L 237
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States
650-723-2160 (Phone)
650-725-0468 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Jonathan D. Levin
Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )
Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
United States
Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )
518 Memorial Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Paul R. Milgrom
Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )
518 Memorial Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States

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References:  14
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