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Sunny Samaritans and Egomaniacs: Price-Fixing in the Gamete Market


Kimberly D. Krawiec


Duke University - School of Law

May 23, 2009

Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 72, No. 3, 2009
UNC Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1356012

Abstract:     
This Article considers the market structure of the human egg (or “oocyte”) donation business, particularly the presence of anti-competitive behavior by the fertility industry, including horizontal price-fixing of the type long considered per se illegal in other industries. The Article explores why this attempted collusion has failed to generate the same public and regulatory concern prompted by similar behavior in other industries, arguing that the persistent dialogue of gift-giving and altruistic donation obscures both the highly commercial nature of egg “donation” and the benefits to the fertility industry of controlling the price of a necessary input into many fertility services – namely, eggs. A comparison to the egg market’s closest cousin – the sperm market – does not reveal similar collusive attempts to depress the price of sperm. A further analysis of the industry explores potential reasons for this difference.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 51

Keywords: egg, oocyte, sperm, antitrust, sherman act, price-fixing, restraint on competition, fertility industry

JEL Classification: K00, K21

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Date posted: March 11, 2009 ; Last revised: May 26, 2009

Suggested Citation

Krawiec, Kimberly D., Sunny Samaritans and Egomaniacs: Price-Fixing in the Gamete Market (May 23, 2009). Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 72, No. 3, 2009; UNC Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1356012. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1356012

Contact Information

Kimberly D. Krawiec (Contact Author)
Duke University - School of Law ( email )
210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States
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