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Screening for Conspiracies: Applications for Litigation, Pre-Litigation, Regulation and Internal Monitoring


Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz


Global Economics Group, LLC; New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics

Patrick Bajari


University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

March 11, 2009


Abstract:     
A screen is a statistical test designed to detect conspiracies aimed at illegally manipulating a market. Competition authorities, academics and consultants have designed a variety screens to detect competition problems, and the use of such screens is increasing. In this paper, we first describe screens designed to detect bid rigging, price fixing, market allocation schemes and commodity market manipulation. Next, we discuss the ways in which screens can be used by plaintiffs and defendants in antitrust cases. These include (i) class certification, (ii) disproving the existence of a cartel; (iii) establishing the immateriality of a cartel; (iv) estimating the effects and damages of collusion; (v) assisting companies in deciding when and whether to file a leniency application; and (vi) assisting managers in large companies to monitor for data manipulation (e.g. falsified reimbursement or accounting statements) and price fixing in purchasing.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 30

Keywords: Screening, Conspiracies, Collusion, Cartels, Manipulations, Detection

JEL Classification: C51, C52, D40, K21, L19

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Date posted: March 12, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Abrantes-Metz, Rosa M. and Bajari, Patrick, Screening for Conspiracies: Applications for Litigation, Pre-Litigation, Regulation and Internal Monitoring (March 11, 2009). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1357862 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1357862

Contact Information

Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz (Contact Author)
Global Economics Group, LLC ( email )
22 Cortlandt Street
Suite 1600
New York, NY 10007
United States
(917) 499-4944 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.globaleconomicsgroup.com
New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics ( email )
269 Mercer Street
New York, NY 10003
United States
Patrick Bajari
University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Economics ( email )
266 Lorch Hall
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
United States
734-763-5319 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www-personal.umich.edu/~bajari/
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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