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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1358474
 
 

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The Supreme Court's New Implied Repeal Doctrine: Expanding Judicial Power to Rewrite Legislation Under the Ballooning Conception of 'Plain Repugnancy'


Jesse W. Markham Jr.


University of San Francisco School of Law

March 12, 2009

Univ. of San Francisco Law Research Paper No. 2009-21

Abstract:     
This article presents a historical, public policy and analytical critique of the United States Supreme Court's revision of the implied repeal doctrine in Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 127 S. Ct. 2383 (2007). The article takes a historical perspective to demonstrate the sound public policy rationale for the more traditional approach to this canon of statutory interpretation. The article analyzes the decision against the backdrop of more than 400 years of English and American courts traditional application of this doctrine to avoid judicial intrusion into the legislative prerogative. It is argued that the Court's revision of the implied repeal doctrine ignores the long and steady history of the doctrine; that the Court's new approach is bad law and bad policy; and that the Court should move to restore the traditional doctrine fully and clearly.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 41

Keywords: implied repeal, antitrust, regulation, plain repugnancy, separation of powers

JEL Classification: L40, L43, L50

working papers series


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Date posted: March 13, 2009 ; Last revised: August 26, 2009

Suggested Citation

Markham, Jesse W., The Supreme Court's New Implied Repeal Doctrine: Expanding Judicial Power to Rewrite Legislation Under the Ballooning Conception of 'Plain Repugnancy' (March 12, 2009). Univ. of San Francisco Law Research Paper No. 2009-21. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1358474 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1358474

Contact Information

Jesse W. Markham Jr. (Contact Author)
University of San Francisco School of Law ( email )
2130 Fulton Street
San Francisco, CA 94117
United States
415-422-4473 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.usfca.edu/faculty/fulltime/markhamj.html
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