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Public and Private Firm Compensation Compared: Evidence from Japanese Tax Returns

J. Mark Ramseyer
Harvard University - Harvard Law School

Minoru Nakazato
University of Tokyo - Faculty of Law

Eric Bennett Rasmusen
Indiana University Bloomington - Department of Business Economics & Public Policy


February 1, 2009

Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 628

Abstract:     
Most studies of executive compensation focus on publicly traded companies. The high levels of compensation there are often attributed to agency slack due to ownership by diffused shareholders. If so, pay at private companies more closely held should be much lower. Governments in the United States and elsewhere do not require the pay of executives in private companies to be publicly disclosed, but until 2004 the tax office of Japan published the name and tax liability of any individual paying over about $100,000 in tax. We match this tax data with rosters of some 1,400 presidents of public and 4,100 presidents of private corporations. We find that public and private company presidents have similar incomes. Both groups earn incomes that rise with the size and profitability of the firm, but the presidents' incomes are more sensitive to profitability at public firms than at private ones. In Japan, at least, public firms pay their presidents no more than private firms do, and tie that compensation more closely to observable performance benchmarks.

JEL Classifications: D24, G30, G34, J31, J33, J44, K23, L84

Working Paper Series

Date posted: March 13, 2009 ; Last revised: June 09, 2009

Suggested Citation

Ramseyer, J. Mark, Nakazato, Minoru and Rasmusen, Eric Bennett, Public and Private Firm Compensation Compared: Evidence from Japanese Tax Returns (February 1, 2009). Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 628. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1358572


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Contact Information

J. Mark Ramseyer (Contact Author)
Harvard University - Harvard Law School ( email )
1575 Massachusetts
Hauser 406
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-496-4878 (Phone)
617-496-6118 (Fax)
Minoru Nakazato
University of Tokyo - Faculty of Law ( email )
7-3-1 Hongo Bunkyo-Ku
Tokyo 113
Japan
Eric Bennett Rasmusen
Indiana University Bloomington - Department of Business Economics & Public Policy ( email )
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States
812-855-9219 (Phone)
812-855-3354 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://php.indiana.edu/~erasmuse
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