L'Etranger: Status, Property Rights and Investment Incentives in Cote d'Ivoire
James E. Fenske
University of Oxford - Department of Economics
March 12, 2009
This study uses data from Cote d'Ivoire to investigate two related questions. First, it tests whether "outsider'' households have relatively small land holdings and less complete rights over land. It finds evidence of both these deficiencies. Second, the link between property rights and investment incentives is explored through an examination of fallow investment. "Outsiders'' fallow a smaller proportion of their land, indicating that their farms are left to regenerate for a shorter period of time. This is only partly explained by their incomplete property rights and relative land-poverty. These differences in investment patterns translate into lower yields per hectare.
Keywords: Property Rights, Investment, Land Tenure
JEL Classification: O12, Q15, D23
Date posted: August 5, 2009 ; Last revised: January 7, 2012
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