Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1359174
 


 



Regulating for Efficiency in Health Care through the Antitrust Laws


Thomas L. Greaney


Saint Louis University School of Law

March, 13 2009

Utah Law Review, Vol. 1995, No. 2, 1995

Abstract:     
The need to evaluate the competitive consequences of cooperation among rivals has long posed a dilemma for antitrust enforcement. Collaboration can reduce rivalry, raise prices and otherwise reduce consumer welfare; at the same time cooperation among rivals carries the promise of creating cost savings, correcting market failures and producing other benefits. In many cases antitrust doctrine requires a balancing of the positive and negative effects of coordination. In health care, federal antitrust enforcement agencies have increasingly turned to regulatory tools including policy statements, advisory opinions, speeches and regulatory decrees settling cases to strike this balance. However, the agencies have paid insufficient attention to the complexities inherent in making these tradeoffs and would be well advised to adopt structured inquiries into efficiencies defenses and related issues.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 37

Keywords: antitrust, efficiencies, market failure, collusion, managed care

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Date posted: April 2, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Greaney, Thomas L., Regulating for Efficiency in Health Care through the Antitrust Laws (March, 13 2009). Utah Law Review, Vol. 1995, No. 2, 1995. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1359174

Contact Information

Thomas L. Greaney (Contact Author)
Saint Louis University School of Law ( email )
100 N. Tucker Blvd.
St. Louis, MO 63108
United States

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