Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1359514
 


 



Defending the Methodological Space for a Neutral Functional Theory of Law


Kenneth M. Ehrenberg


University of Alabama - Department of Philosophy

Spring 2009

Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 91-113, 2009

Abstract:     
I argue that there is methodological space for a functional explanation of the nature of law that does not commit the theorist to a view about the value of that function for society, nor whether law is the best means of accomplishing it. A functional explanation will nonetheless provide a conceptual framework for a better understanding of the nature of law. First I examine the proper role for function in a theory of law and then argue for the possibility of a neutral functional theory, addressing issues raised by Leslie Green, Stephen Perry, Michael Moore and John Finnis.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 36

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Date posted: March 17, 2009 ; Last revised: October 4, 2011

Suggested Citation

Ehrenberg, Kenneth M., Defending the Methodological Space for a Neutral Functional Theory of Law (Spring 2009). Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 91-113, 2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1359514 or http://dx.doi.org/gqp001

Contact Information

Kenneth M. Ehrenberg (Contact Author)
University of Alabama - Department of Philosophy ( email )
PO Box 870218
336 ten Hoor Hall
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487-0218
United States
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