Defending the Possibility of a Neutral Functional Theory of Law
Kenneth M. Ehrenberg
University of Alabama - Department of Philosophy; University of Alabama - School of Law
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 91-113, 2009
I argue that there is methodological space for a functional explanation of the nature of law that does not commit the theorist to a view about the value of that function for society, nor whether law is the best means of accomplishing it. A functional explanation will nonetheless provide a conceptual framework for a better understanding of the nature of law. First I examine the proper role for function in a theory of law and then argue for the possibility of a neutral functional theory, addressing issues raised by Leslie Green, Stephen Perry, Michael Moore and John Finnis.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 36
Date posted: March 17, 2009 ; Last revised: November 14, 2015
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