Dynamic CEO Compensation
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
New York University - Stern School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
New York University (NYU)
University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics; Princeton University - Department of Economics
September 30, 2011
Journal of Finance 67(5), 1603-1647, October 2012
We study optimal compensation in a fully dynamic framework where the CEO consumes in multiple periods, can undo the contract by privately saving, and can temporarily inflate earnings. We obtain a simple closed-form contract that yields clear predictions for how the level and performance-sensitivity of pay varies over time and across firms. The contract can be implemented by a "Dynamic Incentive Account": the CEO's expected pay is escrowed into an account that comprises cash and the firm's equity. The account features state-dependent rebalancing to ensure its equity proportion is always sufficient to induce effort, and time-dependent vesting to deter short-termism.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 63
Keywords: Contract theory, executive compensation, incentives, principal-agent problem, private saving, manipulation, vesting
JEL Classification: D2, D3, G34, J3
Date posted: March 18, 2009 ; Last revised: December 20, 2013
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