Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1361814
 
 

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Behind the Scenes: Performance Target Setting of Annual Incentive Plans


Daniel Sungyeon Kim


Peking University HSBC Business School

Jun Yang


Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance

December 7, 2012

AFA 2010 Atlanta Meetings Paper

Abstract:     
This paper documents the performance metrics used in annual incentive (bonus) plans for chief executive officers (CEOs). Our detailed analysis using earnings per share (EPS) shows that at the time of plan approval, in general, EPS growth targets are set lower than earnings expectations such as EPS growth implied by analyst consensus and the historical EPS growth of the firm and that of the firm’s industry over various horizons. A lower EPS target in the annual incentive plan increases the probability of achieving the target and enhances the ex-ante value of the annual incentive payout for the CEO. However, the slack in setting performance targets is small. Moreover, we find that performance targets are more challenging at firms with strong corporate governance and when the performance measure is more important. Interestingly, while not linked to subsequent performance or risk-taking at the firm, an easy performance target increases the amount of the ex-post payout for the CEO.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 42

Keywords: performance targets, annual incentive plans (bonus programs), executive compensation

JEL Classification: G34, J31, J33

working papers series


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Date posted: March 17, 2009 ; Last revised: May 14, 2014

Suggested Citation

Kim, Daniel Sungyeon and Yang, Jun, Behind the Scenes: Performance Target Setting of Annual Incentive Plans (December 7, 2012). AFA 2010 Atlanta Meetings Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1361814 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1361814

Contact Information

Daniel Sungyeon Kim (Contact Author)
Peking University HSBC Business School ( email )
University Town
Shenzhen, Nanshan District 518055
China
Jun Yang
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance ( email )
1309 E. 10th St.
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States
812-855-3395 (Phone)
812-855-5875 (Fax)

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