Abstract

 


 



Why do Firms Do Good? Evidence from Managerial Efficiency


Lammertjan Dam


University of Groningen - Faculty of Economics and Business

Michael Koetter


Frankfurt School of Finance and Management

Bert Scholtens


University of Groningen - Department of Finance & Accounting

March 17, 2009


Abstract:     
Are firms doing good? And, if so, why do they engage in social responsibility? To find out, we model corporate social responsibility (CSR) as a choice of the firm to self-restrain from the full exploitation of a production set that contains negative externalities. Compared to such an unconstrained set, some firms choose to behave 'responsible'. Therefore, they may deviate systematically from optimal costs and profits and produce inefficiently. We test this theory using stochastic frontier analysis to estimate firm-specific 'inefficiency', which is conditioned on CSR. CSR determines systematic deviations from optimal cost and profit functions of the firm rather than profitability or cost itself. This way of modeling allows us to identify why firms conduct CSR: altruism, strategic reasons, or 'greenwashing'. Using CSR data from Kidder, Lydenberg and Domini for 1991-2004, we establish that various constituting elements of CSR have a significant impact on profit and cost efficiency. Therefore, CSR can not be regarded as greenwashing. Instead, we provide evidence that supports the idea that strategic reasons is the predominant motive of CSR.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 33

Keywords: social responsibility, costs, profits, efficiency, stochastic frontier

JEL Classification: D21, D24, D61, L25, M14

working papers series


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Date posted: March 18, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Dam, Lammertjan, Koetter, Michael and Scholtens, Bert, Why do Firms Do Good? Evidence from Managerial Efficiency (March 17, 2009). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1361937 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1361937

Contact Information

Lammertjan Dam
University of Groningen - Faculty of Economics and Business ( email )
Postbus 72
9700 AB Groningen
Netherlands
+31-50-3636518 (Phone)
Michael Koetter (Contact Author)
Frankfurt School of Finance and Management ( email )
Sonnemannstraße 9-11
Frankfurt am Main, 60314
Germany
Bert Scholtens
University of Groningen - Department of Finance & Accounting ( email )
P.O. Box 800
9700 AH Groningen
Netherlands
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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