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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1362642
 
 

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CEO Turnover and Takeover Threats: New Evidence from Antitakeover Legislation


Jun Huang


Shanghai University of Finance and Economics - School of Accountancy

Shan Zhao


Grenoble Ecole de Management

March 18, 2009


Abstract:     
To understand the interaction between internal control mechanisms and the market for control, using a difference-in-difference methodology, we examine CEO turnover following an exogenous decline of takeover threats---second generation of antitakeover legislation in the U.S. Different from previous research using only time series variation in CEO turnover, it is shown that, compared to a control group, the sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance increased for the firms affected by the laws. The increases are both statistically and economically significant. We also find that the increases in the sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance are concentrated in the firms with stronger board monitoring. Our results suggest that internal control mechanisms and the market for control may be substitutes instead of complements.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 25

Keywords: CEO turnover, takeover, antitakeover legislation, corporate governance

JEL Classification: G30, G34, G38

working papers series


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Date posted: March 22, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Huang, Jun and Zhao, Shan, CEO Turnover and Takeover Threats: New Evidence from Antitakeover Legislation (March 18, 2009). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1362642 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1362642

Contact Information

Jun Huang
Shanghai University of Finance and Economics - School of Accountancy ( email )
No. 777 Guoding Road, Shanghai
Shanghai, 200433
China
Shan Zhao (Contact Author)
Grenoble Ecole de Management ( email )
Grenoble, 38003
France
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