Multi-Stage Investment, Long-Term Asymmetric Information and Pecking Order Revisited
University of Bridgeport - School of Business; University of Guelph - Department of Economics
June 2, 2011
Following some recent empirical papers we focus on the key feature of "Pecking-order theory" (POT) - the existence and the extent of asymmetric information between firms' insiders and outsiders. We analyze the debt-equity choice for financing a two-stage investment and consider different informational structures. When private information is short-term, equilibria are consistent with POT. When private information is long-term and the extent of asymmetric information regarding firms values is small enough while that regarding the earnings profile over time is large enough, equilibria may exist where high quality firms issue equity which are not consistent with POT. This clarifies the role of asymmetric information in explaining equity issues and provides new tools for researchers testing POT.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 22
Keywords: pecking-order theory, long-term asymmetric information, signalling equilibrium, afterissuing underperformance
JEL Classification: D82, D92, G24, G32working papers series
Date posted: March 22, 2009 ; Last revised: May 14, 2013
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