Abstract

 
 

References (65)



 
 

Citations (8)



 


 



Family Business Groups around the World: Financing Advantages, Control Motivations and Organizational Choices


Ronald W. Masulis


University of New South Wales - Australian School of Business; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Financial Research Network (FIRN)

Peter K. Pham


Australian School of Business - University of New South Wales; Financial Research Network (FIRN)

Jason Zein


Australian School of Business; Financial Research Network (FIRN)

April 21, 2011

Review of Financial Studies, Forthcoming
ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 240/2009

Abstract:     
Using a dataset of 28,635 firms in 45 countries, this study investigates the motivations for family-controlled business groups. We provide new evidence consistent with the argument that particular group structures emerge not only to perpetuate control, but also to alleviate financing constraints at the country and firm levels. At the country level, family groups, especially those structured as pyramids, are more prevalent in markets with limited availability of capital. At the firm level, investment intensity is greater for firms held in pyramidal rather than in horizontal structures, reflecting the financing advantages of the former. Within a pyramid, internal equity funding, investment intensity and firm value all increase down the ownership chain. However, group firm performance declines when dual-class shares and cross shareholdings are used as additional control-enhancing mechanisms.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 66

Keywords: Business Groups, Firm Value, Ownership Structure, Family Firms

JEL Classification: G32, G34, D21, D23

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: September 24, 2009 ; Last revised: May 8, 2011

Suggested Citation

Masulis, Ronald W., Pham, Peter K. and Zein, Jason, Family Business Groups around the World: Financing Advantages, Control Motivations and Organizational Choices (April 21, 2011). Review of Financial Studies, Forthcoming; ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 240/2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1363878 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1363878

Contact Information

Ronald W. Masulis
University of New South Wales - Australian School of Business ( email )
Sydney, NSW 2052
Australia
612-9385-5860 (Phone)
612-9385-6347 (Fax)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
Financial Research Network (FIRN)
C/- University of Queensland Business School
St Lucia, 4071 Brisbane
Queensland
Australia
HOME PAGE: http://www.firn.org.au

Peter Kien Pham (Contact Author)
Australian School of Business - University of New South Wales ( email )
Sydney, NSW 2052
Australia

Financial Research Network (FIRN) ( email )
C/- University of Queensland Business School
St Lucia, 4071 Brisbane
Queensland
Australia
HOME PAGE: http://www.firn.org.au

Jason Zein
Australian School of Business ( email )
Sydney, NSW 2052
Australia
+61 2 93855858 (Phone)
+61 2 93855858 (Fax)
Financial Research Network (FIRN)
C/- University of Queensland Business School
St Lucia, 4071 Brisbane
Queensland
Australia
HOME PAGE: http://www.firn.org.au

Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 4,859
Downloads: 1,637
Download Rank: 3,990
References:  65
Citations:  8
Paper comments
No comments have been made on this paper

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo7 in 0.484 seconds