Defensive Politics

Van Wesep, Edward

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1364361

Abstract

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Defensive Politics

Edward Dickersin Van Wesep

University of North Carolina

December 8, 2010

Abstract:
I analyze a minimax solution to the problem of social choice in a multidimensional policy space called the defensive optimum (DO). The proposed solution applies to a wide variety of models in voting including those concerning political advertising, incumbency advantage and interest group politics. The defensive optimum always exists, is unique and is continuous in the density of voter preferences. When a Condorcet winner exists it corresponds to the defensive optimum and, appealingly, the DO is always located on planes about with the density of voters is symmetric.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 33

Keywords: Voting, social choice, politics

JEL Classification: D72

working papers series

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Date posted: March 19, 2009 ; Last revised: September 23, 2012

Suggested Citation

Van Wesep, Edward Dickersin, Defensive Politics (December 8, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1364361 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1364361

Contact Information

Edward Dickersin Van Wesep (Contact Author)

University of North Carolina ( email )

Kenan-Flagler Business School
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3490
United States