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Corporate Diversification and the Cost of Capital

Rebecca N. Hann
University of Maryland

Maria Ogneva
Stanford University - Graduate School of Business

Oguzhan Ozbas
University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business - Finance and Business Economics Department


September 18, 2009

Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 58
Marshall School of Business Working Paper No. FBE 32-09

Abstract:     
We examine whether organizational form matters for a firm's cost of capital. Contrary to the conventional view, our model shows that coinsurance among a firm's business units can reduce systematic risk through the alleviation of countercyclical deadweight costs. Using measures of implied cost of capital constructed from analyst forecasts, we find that diversified firms have on average a lower cost of capital than stand-alone firms. In addition, diversified firms with less correlated segment cash flows have a lower cost of capital, consistent with a coinsurance effect. Holding the magnitude of cash flows constant, our estimates imply an average value gain of approximately 6% when moving from the highest to the lowest cash flow correlation quintile.

Keywords: Corporate diversification, Coinsurance, Cost of capital

Working Paper Series

Date posted: March 21, 2009 ; Last revised: September 30, 2009

Suggested Citation

Hann, Rebecca N., Ogneva, Maria and Ozbas, Oguzhan, Corporate Diversification and the Cost of Capital (September 18, 2009). Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 58; Marshall School of Business Working Paper No. FBE 32-09. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1364481


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Contact Information

Oguzhan Ozbas (Contact Author)
University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business - Finance and Business Economics Department ( email )
Marshall School of Business
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
213-740-0781 (Phone)
213-740-6650 (Fax)
Rebecca N. Hann
University of Maryland ( email )
College Park, MD 20742
United States
Maria Ogneva
Stanford University - Graduate School of Business ( email )
94305-5015
United States
(650) 724-7571 (Phone)
(650) 725-6152 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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