Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1364525
 
 

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Securitization Without Risk Transfer


Viral V. Acharya


New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance

Philipp Schnabl


New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Gustavo Suarez


Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB)

October 20, 2011

AFA 2010 Atlanta Meetings Paper

Abstract:     
We analyze asset-backed commercial paper conduits, which experienced a shadow-banking “run” and played a central role in the early phase of the financial crisis of 2007-09. We document that commercial banks set up conduits to securitize assets worth $1.3 trillion while insuring the newly securitized assets using explicit guarantees. We show that regulatory arbitrage was the main motive behind setting up conduits: the guarantees were structured so as to reduce regulatory capital requirements, more so by banks with less capital, and while still providing recourse to bank balance sheets for outside investors. Consistent with such recourse, we find that conduits provided little risk transfer during the 'run': losses from conduits remained with banks rather than outside investors and banks with more exposure to conduits had lower stock returns.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 51

Keywords: Asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP), shadow banking, regulatory arbitrage, bank capital, conduits, Structured investment vehicle

JEL Classification: G01, G21, G28

working papers series





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Date posted: March 22, 2009 ; Last revised: February 25, 2012

Suggested Citation

Acharya, Viral V. and Schnabl, Philipp and Suarez, Gustavo, Securitization Without Risk Transfer (October 20, 2011). AFA 2010 Atlanta Meetings Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1364525 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1364525

Contact Information

Viral V. Acharya
New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business ( email )
44 West 4th Street
New York, NY NY 10012
United States
HOME PAGE: http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~sternfin/vacharya/public_html/~vacharya.htm
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance
Stern School of Business
44 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012-1126
United States
Philipp Schnabl (Contact Author)
New York University (NYU) - Department of Finance ( email )
Stern School of Business
44 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012-1126
United States
HOME PAGE: http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~sternfin/pschnabl/
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Gustavo Suarez
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB) ( email )
20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20551
United States
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