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The Price of a CEO's Rolodex


Joseph Engelberg


University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Rady School of Management

Pengjie Gao


University of Notre Dame - Mendoza College of Business

Christopher A. Parsons


University of California, San Diego (UCSD)
May 2012


Abstract:     
CEOs with large networks earn more than those with small networks. An additional connection to an executive or director outside the firm increases compensation by about $17,000 on average, more so for “important” members such as CEOs of big firms. Pay-for-connectivity is unrelated to several measures of corporate governance, evidence in favor of an efficient contracting explanation for CEO pay.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 50

Keywords: Executive Compensation, Social Network

JEL Classification: G30

working papers series


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Date posted: March 21, 2009 ; Last revised: May 30, 2012

Suggested Citation

Engelberg, Joseph, Gao, Pengjie and Parsons, Christopher A., The Price of a CEO's Rolodex (May 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1364595 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1364595

Contact Information

Joseph Engelberg (Contact Author)
University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Rady School of Management ( email )
9500 Gilman Drive
Rady School of Management
La Jolla, CA 92093
United States
Pengjie Gao
University of Notre Dame - Mendoza College of Business ( email )
246 Mendoza College of Business
Notre Dame, IN 46556-5646
United States
(574) 631-8048 (Phone)
Christopher A. Parsons
University of California, San Diego (UCSD) ( email )
9500 Gilman Drive
Mail Code 0502
La Jolla, CA 92093-0112
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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