Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1366304
 
 

References (34)



 


 



The Certification Hypothesis of Fairness Opinions for Acquiring Firms


Pierfrancesco La Mura


Handelshochschule Leipzig

Marc Steffen Rapp


University of Marburg - School of Business & Economics

Bernhard Schwetzler


HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management - Department of Finance

Andreas Wilms


Handelshochschule Leipzig (HHL)

July 12, 2011

International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 240-248
HHL Research Paper Series in Corporate Governance No. 4

Abstract:     
We study the certification role of fairness opinions in corporate transactions in a simple non-cooperative setting with asymmetric information and possibly misaligned managerial incentives, and discuss the effect of different regulatory scenarios. Specifically, we compare three settings: one in which no third-party fairness opinion is available, one in which the management is required to obtain a fairness opinion before any transaction, and one in which the management's decision to require a fairness opinion is voluntary. We compare shareholder value in each of the three scenarios and discuss implications for the optimal design of regulatory environments for fairness opinions.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 24

Keywords: Fairness opinion, acquisition, management incentives

JEL Classification: G34, G38, K20

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: March 23, 2009 ; Last revised: May 24, 2012

Suggested Citation

La Mura, Pierfrancesco and Rapp, Marc Steffen and Schwetzler, Bernhard and Wilms, Andreas, The Certification Hypothesis of Fairness Opinions for Acquiring Firms (July 12, 2011). International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 240-248; HHL Research Paper Series in Corporate Governance No. 4. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1366304 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1366304

Contact Information

Pierfrancesco La Mura
Handelshochschule Leipzig ( email )
Jahnallee 59
Leipzig, D-04109
Germany
Marc Steffen Rapp (Contact Author)
University of Marburg - School of Business & Economics ( email )
Am Plan 2
Marburg, D-35037
Germany
Bernhard Schwetzler
HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management - Department of Finance ( email )
Jahnallee 59
D-04109 Leipzig
Germany
+49-341-9851-685 (Phone)
+49-341-9851-689 (Fax)
Andreas Wilms
Handelshochschule Leipzig (HHL) ( email )
Jahnallee 59
Leipzig, D-04109
Germany
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,970
Downloads: 264
Download Rank: 65,467
References:  34

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.453 seconds