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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1367973
 
 

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Systemic Risk through Securitization: The Result of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure


Patricia A. McCoy


University of Connecticut - School of Law

Andrey D. Pavlov


Simon Fraser University (SFU) - Finance Area

Susan M. Wachter


University of Pennsylvania - Wharton School, Department of Real Estate

February 9, 2009

Connecticut Law Review, Vol. 41, p. 493, May 2009

Abstract:     
Without regulation, securitization allowed mortgage industry actors to gain fees and to put off risks. During the housing boom, the ability to pass off risk allowed lenders and securitizers to compete for market share by lowering their lending standards, which activated more borrowing. Lenders who did not join in the easing of lending standards were crowded out of the market. Artificially low risk premia caused the asset price of houses to go up, leading to an asset bubble and breeding fraud. The consequences of lax lending were thereby covered up.

The market might have corrected this problem if investors had been able to express their negative views by short selling mortgage-backed securities, thereby allowing fundamental market value to be achieved. However, the one instrument that could have been used to short sell mortgage-backed securities - the credit default swap - was also infected with underpricing due to lack of minimum capital requirements and regulation to facilitate transparent pricing. As a result, there was no opportunity for short selling in the private-label securitization market. The authors propose countercyclical regulation to prevent a race to the bottom at the height of the business cycle.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 49

Keywords: Securitization, credit default swap, subprime, mortgage, asset bubble

JEL Classification: D21, D43, G12, G18, G21, G28, K20, L13, L51

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Date posted: March 26, 2009 ; Last revised: May 16, 2012

Suggested Citation

McCoy, Patricia A. and Pavlov, Andrey D. and Wachter, Susan M., Systemic Risk through Securitization: The Result of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure (February 9, 2009). Connecticut Law Review, Vol. 41, p. 493, May 2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1367973

Contact Information

Patricia Ann McCoy (Contact Author)
University of Connecticut - School of Law ( email )
65 Elizabeth Street
Hartford, CT 06105
United States
860-570-5056 (Phone)
Andrey D. Pavlov
Simon Fraser University (SFU) - Finance Area ( email )
Burnaby, British Columbia V5A 1S6
Canada
604 291 5835 (Phone)
604 291 4920 (Fax)
Susan M. Wachter
University of Pennsylvania - Wharton School, Department of Real Estate ( email )
The Wharton School
3620 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6330
United States
215-898-6355 (Phone)

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