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Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis and Collective Action

Daniel H. Cole
Indiana University School of Law - Indianapolis


March 27, 2009

Context and the Evolution of Mechanisms for Solving Collective Action Problems - Paper

Abstract:     
This paper explores the significant role Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis (RCBA) plays in facilitating or impeding collective action. Domestically, well constructed RCBAs have facilitated collective action by muting political opposition. RCBAs can of course be manipulated to obstruct collective action or promote inefficient policies. However, the fact that RCBAs require transparency makes those efforts liable to discovery and disclosure, as in the case of the Bush Administration's failed "Clear Skies" initiative. The paper concludes with a discussion of the role RCBA is playing today in structuring international climate change negotiations, substantially determining the bargaining strategies of various parties in accordance with their differential expected costs and benefits.

Keywords: Cost-benefit Analysis, Economic Analysis, Climate Change, EPA, Collective Action

JEL Classifications: C7, D61, D7, H43, K23, K32, K33, Q2

Working Paper Series

Date posted: March 27, 2009 ; Last revised: April 06, 2009

Suggested Citation

Cole, Daniel H., Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis and Collective Action (March 27, 2009). Context and the Evolution of Mechanisms for Solving Collective Action Problems - Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1369338


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Daniel H. Cole (Contact Author)
Indiana University School of Law - Indianapolis ( email )
530 West New York Street
Indianapolis, IN 46202
United States
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