Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1370525
 
 

References (15)



 
 

Citations (1)



 


 



Designing Heuristics: Hybrid Computational Models for Teaching the Negotiation of Complex Contracts


Gregory Todd Jones


Georgia State University - College of Law; Georgia State University - Consortium on Negotiation and Conflict Resolution; University of Georgia - Terry College of Business; Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

March 30, 2009


Abstract:     
The negotiation of even the most straightforward real-world contracts tends to be quite complex. A contract with only 25 distinct issues with two alternatives each presents the parties with more than 33 million possible contracts, far too many to be evaluated exhaustively within feasible time constraints. Furthermore, contract issues that exhibit high levels of interdependence result in highly nonlinear utility functions with the possibility of many local optima. This paper employs hybrid computational models, integrating both simulated annealing and tabu list optimization, to aid in the design of social heuristics and institutional mechanisms that may serve to improve the effectiveness of human negotiators.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 13

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: March 31, 2009 ; Last revised: April 14, 2009

Suggested Citation

Jones, Gregory Todd, Designing Heuristics: Hybrid Computational Models for Teaching the Negotiation of Complex Contracts (March 30, 2009). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1370525 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1370525

Contact Information

Gregory Todd Jones (Contact Author)
Georgia State University - College of Law ( email )
P.O. Box 4037
Atlanta, GA 30302-4037
United States
404-651-2377 (Phone)
Georgia State University - Consortium on Negotiation and Conflict Resolution ( email )
PO Box 4037
Atlanta, GA 30302-4037
United States
University of Georgia - Terry College of Business ( email )
Brooks Hall
Athens, GA 30602-6254
United States
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )
Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 273
Downloads: 70
Download Rank: 194,158
References:  15
Citations:  1

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.313 seconds