Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1371288
 
 

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Procedural Choice in Majoritarian Organizations


Daniel Diermeier


Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management

Carlo Prato


Georgetown University - Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service (SFS); Georgetown University - Department of Economics; Georgetown University - Department of Government

Razvan Vlaicu


Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management

October 2013


Abstract:     
A puzzling feature of self-governing organizations is persistent majority support for restrictive, seemingly non-majoritarian, procedures, e.g., chairs and committees. This paper provides a theory of self-enforcing majoritarian commitment to restrictive procedures. We ask (i) why majorities consent to restrictive procedures in the first place, (ii) why restrictive procedures survive challenges thereafter, and (iii) with what policy consequences. In the model a risk-averse majority allocates procedural rights to increase procedural efficiency, i.e., reduce the procedural uncertainty of free-for-all bargaining. An equilibrium procedure is generally asymmetric and restrictive, generating non-majoritarian policy bias. Still, a majority may persist in endorsing it so as to avoid amplifying procedural and policy uncertainty.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 50

Keywords: procedural choice, procedural efficiency, procedural persistence, self-enforcing commitment

JEL Classification: D72, D78, C72

working papers series





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Date posted: April 1, 2009 ; Last revised: October 22, 2013

Suggested Citation

Diermeier, Daniel and Prato, Carlo and Vlaicu, Razvan, Procedural Choice in Majoritarian Organizations (October 2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1371288 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1371288

Contact Information

Daniel Diermeier
Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )
2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
Carlo Prato
Georgetown University - Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service (SFS) ( email )
Washington, DC 20057
United States
HOME PAGE: http://carloprato.com
Georgetown University - Department of Economics ( email )
Washington, DC 20057
United States
Georgetown University - Department of Government ( email )
ICC, Suite 681
Washington, DC 20057-1034
United States
Razvan Vlaicu (Contact Author)
Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )
2001 Sheridan Rd, MEDS 5th Floor
Evanston, IL 60208-2001
United States
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