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Ambiguous Solicitation: Ambiguous PrescriptionRobert S. GazzaleUniversity of Toronto - Department of Economics; Williams College - Department of Economics Julian JamisonConsumer Financial Protection Bureau - Research Department Alexander KarlanWilliams College - Department of Economics Dean S. KarlanYale University March 31, 2009 Williams College Economics Department Working Paper No. 2009-02 Abstract: We conduct a two-phase laboratory experiment, separated by several weeks. In the first phase, we conduct urn games intended to measure ambiguity aversion on a representative population of undergraduate students. In the second phase, we invite the students back with four different solicitation treatments, varying in the ambiguity of information regarding the task and the payout of the laboratory experiment. We find that those who return do not differ from the overall pool with respect to their ambiguity version. However, no solicitation treatment generates a representative sample. The ambiguous task treatment drives away the ambiguity averse disproportionally, and the detailed task treatment draws in the ambiguity averse disproportionally.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 24 Keywords: Laboratory experimental methods, Experimental economics, Laboratory selection effects JEL Classification: B40, C81, C90, C91, D80, D83 working papers seriesDate posted: April 1, 2009Suggested CitationContact Information
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