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Monopolistic Competition Between Differentiated Products with Demand for More Than One Variety


Andrei Hagiu


Harvard Business School - Strategy Unit

July 15, 2006

Harvard Business School Strategy Unit Working Paper No. 09-095

Abstract:     
We analyze the existence of pure strategy symmetric price equilibria in a generalized version of Salop (1979)'s circular model of competition between differentiated products - namely, we allow consumers to purchase more than one brand. When consumers purchase all varieties from which they derive non-negative net utility, there is no competition, so that each firm behaves like an unconstrained monopolist. When each consumers is interested in purchasing an exogenously given number (n) of varieties, we show that there is no pure strategy symmetric price equilibrium in general (for n > 2 with linear transportation costs). In turn, if the limitation on the number of varieties consumers purchase comes from a budget constraint then we obtain a multiplicity of symmetric price equilibria, which can be indexed by the number of varieties consumers purchase in equilibrium.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 48

Keywords: Monopolistic competition, Product Variety.

JEL Classification: L1, L2, L8

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Date posted: April 3, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Hagiu, Andrei, Monopolistic Competition Between Differentiated Products with Demand for More Than One Variety (July 15, 2006). Harvard Business School Strategy Unit Working Paper No. 09-095. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1372751 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1372751

Contact Information

Andrei Hagiu (Contact Author)
Harvard Business School - Strategy Unit ( email )
Harvard Business School
Soldiers Field Road
Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-496-6745 (Phone)
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