Early Admissions at Selective Colleges
Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Stanford University - Department of Economics; Stanford Graduate School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
NBER Working Paper No. w14844
Early admissions is widely used by selective colleges and universities. We identify some basic facts about early admissions policies, including the admissions advantage enjoyed by early applicants and patterns in application behavior, and propose a game-theoretic model that matches these facts. The key feature of the model is that colleges want to admit students who are enthusiastic about attending, and early admissions programs give students an opportunity to signal this enthusiasm.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 38working papers series
Date posted: April 7, 2009
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