The Hidden 'Judiciary': An Empirical Examination of Executive Branch Justice
Vanderbilt University - Law School
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski
Cornell Law School
Andrew J. Wistrich
California Central District Court
April 7, 2009
Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper No. 09-12
Vanderbilt Public Law Research Paper No. 09-09
Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-010
Administrative law judges attract little scholarly attention, yet they decide a large fraction of all civil disputes. In this Article, we demonstrate that these executive branch judges, like their counterparts in the judicial branch, tend to make predominantly intuitive rather than predominantly deliberative decisions. This finding sheds new light on executive branch justice by suggesting that judicial intuition, not judicial independence, is the most significant challenge facing these important judicial officers.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 56
Keywords: Judges, ALI, Decision-making, Intuition, Deliberation, Heuristic and biasesworking papers series
Date posted: April 8, 2009
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