Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1374346
 
 

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The Hidden 'Judiciary': An Empirical Examination of Executive Branch Justice


Chris Guthrie


Vanderbilt University - Law School

Jeffrey J. Rachlinski


Cornell Law School

Andrew J. Wistrich


California Central District Court

April 7, 2009

Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper No. 09-12
Vanderbilt Public Law Research Paper No. 09-09
Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-010

Abstract:     
Administrative law judges attract little scholarly attention, yet they decide a large fraction of all civil disputes. In this Article, we demonstrate that these executive branch judges, like their counterparts in the judicial branch, tend to make predominantly intuitive rather than predominantly deliberative decisions. This finding sheds new light on executive branch justice by suggesting that judicial intuition, not judicial independence, is the most significant challenge facing these important judicial officers.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 56

Keywords: Judges, ALI, Decision-making, Intuition, Deliberation, Heuristic and biases

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Date posted: April 8, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Guthrie, Chris and Rachlinski , Jeffrey J. and Wistrich, Andrew J., The Hidden 'Judiciary': An Empirical Examination of Executive Branch Justice (April 7, 2009). Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper No. 09-12; Vanderbilt Public Law Research Paper No. 09-09; Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1374346 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1374346

Contact Information

Chris Guthrie (Contact Author)
Vanderbilt University - Law School ( email )
131 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203-1181
United States
615-322-6823 (Phone)
615-322-6631 (Fax)
Jeffrey John Rachlinski
Cornell Law School ( email )
524 College Ave
Myron Taylor Hall
Ithaca, NY 14853
United States
607-255-5878 (Phone)
607-255-7193 (Fax)
Andrew J. Wistrich
California Central District Court ( email )
Los Angeles, CA 90012
United States
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