Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1374389
 


 



Bundling and Economies of Scope


Antonin Arlandis


France Telecom - Research & Development

April 7, 2009

Communications & Strategies, Special Issue, November 2008

Abstract:     
This paper examines how bundling and economies of scope impact competition. We model a duopoly where two firms, produce the two components of a system. We show that firms always have a unilateral incentive to target a discount to consumers who buy the two goods close to the same firm. In our model, the Nash equilibrium is one of mixed bundling. The economies of scope (created by bundling) act to reduce (increase) firms' profits when the market is completely (partially) covered. Moreover, economies of scope act to increase consumer surplus.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 13

Keywords: Bundling, economies of scope, triple and quadruple play

JEL Classification: L11, M31

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Date posted: April 8, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Arlandis, Antonin, Bundling and Economies of Scope (April 7, 2009). Communications & Strategies, Special Issue, November 2008. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1374389

Contact Information

Antonin Arlandis (Contact Author)
France Telecom - Research & Development ( email )
39-40 rue de General Leclerc
Issy-Les-Moulineaux, F-92131
France
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